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Inflation t e [1, 12] Inflation t e [13, 14] B. P arameters Figure 1 is a graph of the aggregate demand and supply schedules for the first period of every experiment. The basic parameters involve eight types of schedules, which are contained in Table 2 . Shown there are the periodic values for each type and how they aggregate to the market equilibrium.
Although Figure 1 is the actual aggregate demand and supply schedule for period one of all experi ments, these aggregate schedules remain constant throughout all periods in only experiments 1 and 2, the controls. In all other experiments the equilibrium price is shifted upward at a constant rate of 15 percent for a number of periods. This is accomplished by adding .15 Pf_ 1
to all values in all schedules in order to determine the parameters for period t. The individual redemption values and costs of each type vary accordingly as in Table 3 . In addition to a displacement upward by a constant, each period the basic schedules are rotated among the participants. This rotation which is contained in Table 4 was in tended to mask the formula that was behind the parameter changes. We are interested in comparing behavior under inflation to that in a stable market. Experiments 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are the inflating markets. Experiments 1 and 2 are used as control experiments for the basis of our comparisons.
C. P rocedures
The subjects were undergraduate students from the California Institute of Technology and Pasadena City College. Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 used students recruited from Pasadena City Col lege (PCC) while the California Institute of Technology (CIT) students were used for experiments 7, 8, and 9. A pilot experiment was also conducted at CIT, but the results are not reported here.
While the PCC subjects were inexperienced, many of the CIT subjects had previous experience in the oral double auction procedure. The subjects were told that they would earn money according to decisions they made during the experiment and, in the PCC experiments, that they would receive four additional dollars simply for being present. A period zero was conducted without payment in experi ments 1, 2, 5, and 6, to check the students' understanding of the trading rules and accounting. The ex periments typically lasted two and one half hours, after which the subjects were paid in cash.
The markets conducted were all multiple unit oral double auctions. In each case there were four buyers (numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4) and four sellers (numbered 5, 6, 7, and 8). The markets proceeded in a sequence of trading periods, each lasting five minutes with a warning when there was one minute remaining and another when there were thirty seconds remaining in the period. The currency in these markets was francs, with each franc being worth .01 dollars in experiments 7, 8, and 9, and being worth
.008 dollars in the remaining experiments. The experiments and individual incentives were explained to the subjects in terms of francs.
Bids to buy were tendered by a buyer who would orally indicate his/her number first, then the value per unit of the bid, and then the number of units desired to be purchased. For example, "two bids 250 for three." Asks to sell were announced verbally: "seven asks 400 for two." Bids and asks could also be canceled at any time, but once a bid or ask was accepted, the contract was final, denoted by a circling of the accepted bid or ask as well as the identification number of the acceptor, as shown in Fig   ure 2 . Furthermore, any integral portion of an ask or bid could be accepted, with the remaining units forming the new outstanding bid or ask (also shown).
Identification numbers, values, and number of units outstanding were written from left to right for bids and right to left for asks so that identification numbers were always in the outermost columns and the number of units outstanding was always in the innermost columns. 
FIGURE 2
Each participant was given a folder which contained his/her private information describing to him/her the value of any decisions he/she might make during the experiment. All folders contained a set of instructions (which was read aloud) and a stack of accounting sheets, which contained one sheet for each period, including period zero where appropriate. All PCC experiments provided each subject with forms for the recording and submitting of the subject's prediction of the mean contract price for the ensuing period. The stack of accounting sheets for each of the PCC experiments was stapled together so that the chart for period t was not exposed until the chart for period t -1 was removed. In experiments 1, 2, 5, 6 a cover sheet was introduced so that even the first period's chart was unseen at the time of the first prediction. (The numbering system does not reflect the order in which the experiments were con ducted.)
In regard to the PCC experiments, the prediction process was conducted as follows. Before the used chart of period t was removed, the subjects were asked to submit predictions as to the mean con tract price of period t + 1. At the end of each period, the mean contract price was calculated and posted on a side blackboard so that the complete history of this value was available to all subjects at all times.
The participant with the smallest difference (absolute) between his/her predicted price and the actual mean contract price earned an additional one hundred twenty-five francs that period. If a tie occurred, each of the tying participants was awarded one hundred twenty-five francs. First period predictions for experiments 1, 2, 5, and 6 were made with absolutely no knowledge of any parameters of the experi ment, giving cause at times for the omission of these first predictions from the models that will be pro posed.
SECTION II. PROPERTIES OF INFLATING MARKETS
A. Overview First, an overview is provided. Figure 3 contains the time series of average price (dots) for all inflating markets, and Figure 4 contains the same time series for the two stationary markets. In addition to prices, the figures contain the average forecast (triangles) of all participants in all markets. These will give the reader a visual impression of the market relative to the parameters. The solid lines indicate the competitive equilibrium based on the parameters that existed each period. It is clear from the averages that the inflating markets approach the moving equilibrium. Simi larly, the stationary markets approach the predicted equilibrium and then begin an upward adjustment as the inflationary final three periods begin. The forecast data move at the same rate as the average price. The visual impression that the forecasts understate actual prices is true of pooled data but the proposition is difficult to establish at the individual level of analysis. The final three periods of stationary prices show forecasts overshooting ac tual prices. This is clearly inflationary expectations but it is difficult to see a big effect on prices.
The volume data are summarized in Table 5 and the efficiency data are summarized in Table 6 . 1
Inspection reveals that efficiency levels tended to persist at the higher ranges in the stationary markets more than in the inflating markets. Volumes also tended to be higher in the stationary markets. No doubt the higher volume in the stationary markets is reflected in the higher efficiencies. Figure 5 contains a more detailed time series for all experiments. The competitive equilibrium has been subtracted from all contracts. The sequence of dots indicates the difference between the equili brium price predicted by the competitive model and the actual price at which a contract was made. The sequence is in the order in which the contracts occurred. In addition, the figures contain the forecasts of average price made by subjects before they saw their own parameters for the upcoming period. Fore casts are plotted on the vertical lines at the start of a period. These data are included because the models presented below do not capture the complexities in the data. The equilibrating tendency of all markets is apparent in the data. It is also clear that the forecasts are near the pattern of trades. The variances, however, are complicated as will be discussed.
1) Market efficiency is the ratio of actual total earnings of subjects to the maximum possible earnings. This measure is equivalent to the percentage of maximum consumer plus producer surplus actually achieved by the market If markets are 100 percent efficient, then no further gains from exchange exist. B. Relative Adjustment Speed Do constantly inflating markets adjust to equilibrium and, if they do, does it occur with the same speed as stationary markets? Three different measures suggest themselves: (1 ) deviation of mean price from the theoretical equilibrium price; (2 ) mean absolute deviation of contract price from the mean con tract price; and (3 ) mean absolute deviation of contract price from theoretical equilibrium price. All three models were checked.
P t =the mean contract price in period t. P t e =the competitive equilibrium price in period t.
Pr= the cth contract price in period t. V t = the volume of trades in period t. z t k = the measure of convergence according to which of the k e 1, 2, 3 measures are used. z t k = ae � t is the assumed form.
For the first measure z/1 ) = IPf-Pr I =ae � t . The regression results in Table 7 show that the direction of convergence is as expected <P < 0) for all experiments except experiment four. However, close inspection indicates that p tends to be smaller and significant in the stationary (PCC) experiments than in the inflating (PCC) experiments. The R 2 are also lower in the inflating markets. Interestingly enough the inflating markets at CIT behave similarly to the stationary markets at PCC, which suggests that answers to the relative speed questions will be sensitive to the subject pool. In any case, after con trolling for the influence of subject pool by comparing only experiments conducted at PCC, the behavior of an absolute difference between average price and the competitive equilibrium price suggests that inflating markets converge more slowly to the moving equilibrium than markets converge to a stationary equilibrium. The negative P in this model guarantees eventual convergence.
A second measure of convergence is the dispersion of contract prices around the mean price.
We define
and report the regression of the log in Table 7 . The two control experiments with stationary parameters show a pronounced fall in dispersion as the number of periods increase. For both p < 0 and it is significant. For the inflating experiments the slope term p is negative for only two experiments and it is significantly negative in only one. So ultimate convergence or even a decrease is not suggested. The inflating experiments at CIT begin with relatively low dispersion so the failure to shrink further is not too surprising. In any case, we can again conclude that a difference exists in adjustment speed in that inflating markets exhibit slower adjustment when we have controlled for subject pool differences.
The third measure is the mean absolute deviation of contract prices from the theoretical equili brium price, which captures both of the above measures. Let 
Exp. (t -ratio) (t-ratio) (s.e. ) (t -ratio) (t -ratio) (s.e. ) (t -ratio) and study the regression results of the log transform in Table 7 . Again the convergence tendency of all experiments can be seen in the � < 0 and comparable ex. magnitudes. The � are smaller for the stationary markets and the level of significance is greater than in all inflating markets except number eight . Again, this suggests faster convergence under stationarity.
Both measures that use the equilibrium price as a parameter tell the same story. All markets are converging. The degree of "disequilibrium" seems to be higher in the inflating markets and the rate of convergence is slower. However, this general conclusion is likely to be sensitive to the unmeasured properties of the agents because the inflating markets at CIT are comparable in some respects to the sta tionary markets at PCC.
C. Bids and Asks as P art of the Convergence P rocess Vernon Smith, Gerry Suchanek, and Arlington Williams (1986) have advanced a model that claims that lagged excess bids are a good indicator of the next period contract price changes. Until now, only experiments involving asset trading have been used to test the model. Some adjustments are neces sary to adapt the models to commodities that have no asset structure. Let ( B -A )1 be the number of bids in period t minus the number of asks. With an actual inflation (due to parametric drifts of demand) of D.. t francs after period t -1, the Smith, Suchanek, and Williams model adapted for application is 
Williams model as above, the a. term permits a constant factor to the adjustment process so the 13 can capture the influence of the parameter drifts and y captures what might remain to be explained in the data after the theoretical model and the constant .
The parameter estimates are in Table 8 . All the experiments but two have a positive value for y and three of the seven have t 's greater than 1.60. It seems as though the excess bids have some slight explanatory power and might help as a predictor of the rate of inflation in relation to the underlying parameters. In period 13 of experiments 3, 4, 5, and 6 inflation is stopped entirely so that 8 13 = 0. In experi ments 1 and 2 inflation starts in this period so that 8 13 = 28. In experiments 7, 8, and 9 inflation stops in period 12 so that 8 1 2 = 0. Out of curiosity, we wanted to see if the excess lagged bids model would work into the regime change if the participants somehow knew that 8 13 = 0, using the coefficients that have been derived from the previous eleven or twelve periods, as the case may be.
The results are in Table 9 . The accuracy of these predictions is surprising for experiments 3 and 5, but in the remaining three instances, one can see that the results are not as striking. The model seems to work marginally well even leading into a regime change, but, of course, the subjects could not possi bly have any knowledge that 81 was going to drop to zero as evidenced by the predictions given for period 13 in experiments 3 and 5. Two questions are posed for this section.
(1) Are forecasts of buyers lower than forecasts of sell ers, thereby exhibiting some sort of wishful thinking or possible strategic behavior? ( 2 ) Are aggregate forecasts accurate?
The first question is easy. The answer is no. In any given experiment the average forecast of buyers is just as likely to be above the average forecast of sellers as below ( 48n8). The probability of equal likelihood cannot be rejected at any conventional level of confidence ( P r (x � 48 I 0 = 1/2) = .18).
The second question is more complicated. The rational expectations hypothesis maintains that the difference between average price and forecasts is white noise. The difference should have a zero mean and be uncorrelated with other variables. The model is really to be applied at the individual level of analysis, but some of the properties of the average forecasts across individuals are not without in terest.
Some notation is necessary.
f / = fore cast of period t average price made by agent i after having observed prices in period t-1. f t =mean forecast of all agents of period t price.
By pooling all the relevant periods (t � 2) during the inflating periods of markets, we arrive at n =39 This yields stronger support for the rational expectations hypothesis by revealing the instability of the intercept term (-10 . 41 francs) which now has no significance level at all.
The possible sensitivity of the model to the time periods leads naturally to questions regarding the statistical properties of the data. In particular, the constant variances of forecasts as assumed by the regression model is suspect. A close examination of the data in Figure 5 suggests that the variance of forecasts across forecasters is sensitive to the forecast accuracy in the previous period. For example, no tice the relatively big variance in forecasts after regime changes.
The following model verifies that suspicion.
-89. 1 5 + 3. 42 I P r -1 -f 1-1 I 8 i (6.69) (5. 13) n =55 R 2 = . 3 3 std. reg. error = 25. 8 9
The variance in forecasts the next period is systematically related to the forecast error. While these measurements are taken for the periods with no system "shock" such as period 13 , the phenomenon is clearly present there. The variances in forecasts clearly go up in period 14 after the large error in fore casts in period 13.
B. P roperties of Individual Forecasts
This section examines some of the properties of individual forecasts. Most of the attention is de voted to adaptive expectations and rational expectations. These will be covered in the two subsections. 2
Adaptive Expectations
The models above suggest that forecasts might be following adaptive expectations. The data in Figure 3 suggest underestimation and the variance model suggests a sensitivity to error in forecasts.
Such patterns lead to a suspicion that adaptive expectations models would summarize the data but the surprising result is that the adaptive expectation model does not seem to be appropriate. Estimates for all individuals for all experiments in which forecasts were made are in Table 10 .
The estimates give no support at all for adaptive expectations in inflating markets. The joint hypothesis that A.1 = 1, 0 < "'2 < 1 can be rejected in all inflating markets. In stationary markets the adaptive expec tations model looks better than in the inflating markets in that the hypothesis cannot be rejected for five of the sixteen people. Aside from those five people all other data support the rational expectations over adaptive expectations. In inflating markets the joint hypothesis that A.1 = 1. 15 and Ai= 0 can be rejected
2) The organization of this section follows the literature review provided by LOVELL (1986). for only four of the thirty-two individuals at .01 and it can be rejected for only eight of the thirty-two in dividuals at .05. So for twenty-four individuals the rational expectations model fits well. In stationary markets the joint hypothesis that A.1=1 and Ai = 0 can be rejected at the .01 level (and for none at .05)
for only one of the sixteen individuals in these markets. Thus, in the context of this model, the data sup port some form of rational expectations over adaptive expectations.
Rational Expectations Models
The pooled data for final periods and the adaptive expectations modeling both lend some support for a rational expectations formulation. The idea is that individual forecast errors should be unbiased and that all information that exists at the time of the forecast is used in the forecast.
The idea that forecast errors are unbiased takes the form of two different specifications. One was developed by Mills (1957 ) and the second is due to Muth (1961 ) . They differ only in the choice of the dependent variable. We will estimate the Muth model and use a test on the coefficient to distinguish between the two.
f t = °<> + a. 1P t + Et (Mills) P , =Po+ P if, + e , (Muth) In the Muth formulation the rational expectations hypothesis is tested by the null hypothesis Po= 0, P 1 = 1. If this hypothesis is not rejected, the Muth null model can be distinguished from Mills by the relationship between the R 2 and the coefficient. Specifically, a necessary and sufficient condition 3 that the Muth model is accepted over the Mills model is that R < al . <a1 is the value of P 1 derived by application of the regression techniques. )
Estimates of the Muth model are in Table 11 . For the control experiments 1 and 2 there is al most no variation in the independent variables plus a possibly small serial correlation. As a result the regression results for the controls are misleading. A direct examination of the errors indicates that the mean forecast error in the controls was almost zero for all individuals. The highest mean error in both experiments was eight francs. On average the mean forecast error across individuals was -.0 6 francs.
For none of the individuals can we reject the hypothesis that the mean forecast equals the mean price.
These results suggest the existence of fundamental limitations on the precision that one might expect from forecasts. When the variation of prices is very small, the relationship between price and forecast simply looks like a small "cloud" rather than a line through the origin.
The results of the inflationary markets, experiments 3 through 6, support the rational expecta tions hypothesis. For only nine of the thirty-two people can we come close (t � 1. 50 ) to rejecting the hy pothesis that Po= 0. In all thirty-two cases p1 is close to 1 and significantly different from 0. For only one of the thirty-two cases can we reject the joint hypothesis that Po = 0 and P 1 = 1. Of course these results cannot prevent the nagging doubts that persist because the sample sizes are so small. One cannot avoid suspecting that, had the sample size been bigger, slight departures from the model would have be come significant in the statistical tests. Nevertheless, the general approach of rational expectations over, say, adaptive expectations is certainly supported.
A check of the inequality R < a . indicates that the Muth model is supported over the Mills model. Of the thirty-two individuals, twenty-one had R < a1 , ten had R > a1 as required by the Mills model and there was one equality. Interestingly enough all the nine cases for which the rational expecta forecasters incorporate all available information into their forecasts. This hypothesis is interpreted through the regression of the error on lagged variables. In particular we check ef=Pr -< �J + �f f , ) =yi Pr-1 + 11/ to see if past prices are correlated with the error and could therefore be used to improve the forecasts.
The equation was run for each individual in each of the markets in which forecasts were made. The strong rational expectations hypothesis is that y i = 0.
The results in Table 12 are remarkably consistent. For only three individuals in the inflating ex periments is y greater than .01 and the t-ratios are never over 1.2. The individual errors seem to be white noise, thereby suggesting that individuals use all available information in their forecasts. That is, the data support the strong version of the rational expectations hypothesis. In no case can "( = 0 be re jected. When applied to pooled data (all periods, t > 1, for all individuals, with inflationary markets and sta tionary markets treated separately) the results are (t -ratios are below coefficient estimates):
IV. INDIVIDUAL CHOICE BEHAVIOR
Inflating markets 3-6 Pit -Pr= -4.80 + .03 (yi1 -Pr)+ (-.004) (// -Pr) (-2.87) (2.16) The idea that one would get from the expected utility hypothesis is that prices should respond positively to both underlying values and expectations. As can be seen from the estimates, this property appears to be absent from the data. Aside from the significant .03 coefficient in the first equation, noth ing else exists in the data. The significant intercept reflects upward drifting prices within a period and first trades tend to be nearer the early parts of periods. This property of the adjustment path might pro vide a better vehicle for looking for the phenomenon but we have not pursued it .
We conclude that neither private values nor initial expectations account for variations of prices away from the mean price. Individuals seem to acquire the information used to make trading decisions within the period in which it is to be used. Evidently the attitudes formed prior to the period are not as important as information gathered on the spot. In addition, individuals appear to be willing to do as well as possible without regard to some type of sunk cost fallacy that would tie their decisions to redemption values and costs. Within the set of profitable trades, individuals do as well as possible without regard to parameters over which they have no control. That is, they do not follow markup or markdown strategies.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The most basic result is that constantly inflating markets converge to the (inflating) equilibrium but they converge more slowly than do stationary markets. The disequilibrium disappears less rapidly in the inflating markets. This phenomenon leads to paradoxes.
The price forecasts are captured reasonably well by the rational expectations hypothesis. Thus, the results differ slightly from those reported by Williams (1987) . Even the strong version of the ration al expectations hypothesis is supported. But, how can rational expectations exist in the presence of sub stantial market disequilibrium? Individuals are accurately forecasting a price that is in disequilibrium.
But, disequilibrium seems to be inconsistent with the existence of rational and perfectly informed indi viduals.
If the number of bids exceeds the number of asks in one period, the following period will experi tations. Yet an examination of aggregate forecasts demonstrates that the variance of forecasts across in dividuals is directly related to average forecast error in the previous period. One model says errors do not matter and the other suggests that they do. How can this be rationalized?
